Category Archives: Short Sale

Psychological Stages of a Bubble

The housing bubble is unwinding like many asset bubbles before it. Understanding and recognizing these stages will help you better time your home purchase; Timing Does Matter.

83 Vermillion   Irvine, CA 92603  kitchen

Asking Price: $439,000

Address: 83 Vermillion Irvine, CA 92603

{book6}

Change changing places
Root yourself to the ground
Capitalize on this good fortune
One word can bring you round
Changes

Changes — Yes

Market conditions are constantly changing. These conditions can best be understood as part of a series of psychological stages the market must pass through in order to work of the excesses of the housing bubble. I first wrote about the stages of a bubble in Houses Should Not Be a Commodity. I rewrote and expanded that work in The Great Housing Bubble which is reprinted in this post. For more conceptual background on the basics of market function, please read Efficient Markets vs Behavioral Finance.

Psychological Stages of a Bubble

Once a bubble starts to form, it will go through several identifiable stages: enthusiasm, greed, denial, fear, capitulation, and despair. Each of these stages is characterized by different speculator emotional states and different resulting behaviors. There are outside forces that also act on the market in predictable ways in each one of these stages. Most often, these outside factors serve to reinforce the market’s herd behavior and exacerbate changes in price.

Precipitating Factor

There is often a precipitating factor causing the initial price rally that pushes prices above their supported fundamental values. A bubble rally is usually kicked off by some exogenous event, but it may occur simply because prices have been rising and investors take notice, or it can be merely the result of a lack of investor fear and the widespread belief prices cannot go down. In a typical market, there is a significant selloff when prices exceed fundamental valuations. This selloff is a natural reaction to inflated prices as a decline to fundamental valuations is normal and expected. Many seasoned market observers will “sell short” here to profit from the initially inflated values caused during the take-off stage. However, in a financial mania, this sell off is short-lived, and it traps many who are bearish on asset pricing on the wrong side of the trade. This “short squeeze” may prompt a feverish activity of buying as short sellers cover their positions before their losses get too great. A short squeeze may act as a precipitating factor. In a securities market, a precipitating factor may be a very large order hitting the trading floor, and in a real estate market it may be a dramatic lowering of interest rates as it was in the Great Housing Bubble. Regardless of its cause, the initial price rise has the potential to spark sufficient interest to prompt further buying and set a series of events in motion which repeat with a remarkable consistency. Market bubbles can be found in all financial markets and on multiple timeframes.

Figure 35: Psychological Stages of a Bubble Market

Enthusiasm Stage

At the beginning of the enthusiasm stage, prices are already inflated, so there is cautious buying from traders looking for trends and momentum. If prices fail to drop to fundamental valuations and instead push higher, media attention is often drawn to the speculative market. The general public starts to take notice of the money being made by people who have bought the featured asset and they begin to participate in larger numbers. Of course, this stimulates more buying and prices continue to climb. The market sentiment turns very bullish. Buyers are everywhere and sellers are scarce. At this point, prices are completely detached from fundamental valuations, but people are not buying because of the underlying value, they are buying because prices are going up.

In residential real estate markets, the enthusiasm stage is often greeted by lenders with open arms. With prices rising, there is little risk of loss from default. If a borrower gets in trouble, they can simply sell into rising prices, and neither party takes a loss. With neither party fearing loss, and since lenders make most of their money on the transaction itself through origination fees, there is an inevitable lowering of standards to meet market demand. This in turn creates more market demand leading to further lowering of standards. The credit cycle reinforces the bullish psychology in the market and helps push prices even higher.

Greed Stage

In the greed stage, the bullish sentiment reaches a feverish pitch and prices rise very rapidly. Every owner in the market is making money and most believe it will go on forever. As prices continue to climb, buyers become very enthusiastic about owning the asset, and they tell all their friends about their great investment. The word-of-mouth awareness and increased media coverage bring even more buyers to the market. Egomania sets in as everyone thinks she is a financial genius. Any intellectual analysis at this stage is merely a cover for emotional buying and greed. During the Great Housing Bubble, there were many instances of properties receiving a dozen or more offers the day they were listed, with many in excess of the asking price. Encouraged by realtors, some buyers wrote emotional letters to sellers to convince them why they should be bestowed with the honor of home ownership.

Most people who are bullish already own the asset, but for prices to continue to rise there must be more buying. For buying to occur, someone who was either bearish or ignorant of the rally must be convinced to buy. In other words, a greater fool must be found. Once everyone is made aware of the market rally and is convinced to buy, you simply run out of new buyers. Once there is a shortage of potential buyers, prices can only go down.

Denial Stage

When the limit of affordability is reached and the pool of available buyers is exhausted, prices start to decline. At first market participants are still overwhelmed by greed, and they choose to ignore the signs that the party might be over. In 2007 most real estate markets were in the denial stage as prices had not dropped enough to cause real fear. Denial is apparent in polls in mid-2007 where 85 percent believed their home would rise in value during the next five years, and 63 percent believe a house is a good investment. That is denial. It is also apparent in the number of homes purchased during the greed stage that are held for sale at breakeven prices-even if this is above market. When the inventory is large, and houses stay on the market for a long time, prices are too high. Sellers who refuse to lower their prices to take a small loss are in denial about the state of the market. They believe bids will increase and some buyer will come along and pay their price-after all, that is the way it was just a couple of years prior. Buyers who bought in the enthusiasm stage are still ahead, so they feel no urgency to sell. They have made good money already and they will hold on with hopes of making a little more. Since they believe the asset will appreciate again (and they have no exit strategy), this group of buyers does not sell. In contrast, the few traders who still hold positions liquidate and go back into cash. Successful traders recognize the emotion of denial as a signal to exit their positions to lock in profits or prevent further damage.

In the denial stage of a residential real estate market, many speculators are unable to obtain the sale price they desire. The accumulation of unrealistically priced houses starts to build a large inventory of homes “hanging” over the market. Overhead supply is a condition in a financial market when many units are held for sale at prices above current market prices. Generally there will be a minor rally after the first price decline as those who missed the big rally but still believe prices will only go up enter the market and cause a short-term increase in prices. This is a bear rally. It is aptly named as those bullish on the market buy right before the bear market reverses and quickly declines. For prices to resume a sustained rally, the overhead supply must be absorbed by the market. Once prices stopped going up and actually began to fall, demand is lessened by diminished buyer enthusiasm and the contraction of credit caused by mounting lender losses. With increasing supply and diminished demand prices cannot rally to absorb the overhead supply. The overall bullish bias to market psychology has not changed much at this point, because owners are in denial about the new reality of the bear market; however, the insufficient quantity of buyers and the beginnings of a credit crunch signal the rally is over and the bubble has popped.

Fear Stage

In the grieving process there is a shift from denial to fear when the reality being denied becomes too obvious to be ignored or pushed out of awareness. There is no acceptance of reality, just the idea that reality might be fact. The fact that an investment might turn out to be a very poor financial decision with long-term repercussions to the speculator’s financial life is generally very difficult to accept. The imaginings of a horrifying future creates fear, and this fear causes people to make decisions regarding their investments.

The most important change in the market in the fear stage is caused by the belief that the rally is over. Price rallies are a self-sustaining price-to-price feedback loop: prices go up because rising prices induces people to buy which in turn drives prices even higher. Once it is widely believed that the rally is over, it is over. Market participants who once only cared about rising prices suddenly become concerned about valuations. Since prices are far above fundamental values and prices are not rising, there is little incentive to buy. The rally is dead.

Another major psychological change occurs in this stage after people accept the rally is dead: people reassess and change their relationship to debt. During the rally, debt becomes a means to take a position in the housing commodity market. Nobody cares how much they are borrowing because they never intend to pay off the loan through payments from their wage income. Most believe they will pay off whatever they borrow in the future when they sell the house for more than they paid. Once prices stop going up, people realize they are simply renting from the bank, and the only way to get ahead and build equity is to pay off a mortgage. The desire to borrow 8 to 10 times income diminishes rapidly as people realize they could never pay off such a large sum. What started in the denial stage as an involuntary contraction of credit, in the fear stage becomes a voluntary contraction of credit as people simply do not want to borrow such large amounts of money.

In August of 2007, a more serious credit crunch gripped financial markets, and during the times that followed there was increased liquidation of bank held inventory. Banks tried to get their wishing prices through the prime selling season, but by the end of the year, there was pressure to get these non-performing assets off their books. The sales of bank foreclosures and the ongoing tightening of credit drove prices down an additional 5% to 10%. This caused some major problems for owners of residential real estate. Fear began to grip the market.

By the time a financial market enters the fear stage, greed stage buyers are seriously underwater. Comparable properties may be selling for 10% less than their breakeven price, and there is little hope that prices will rally. Some sell at this point and take a loss, but most do not. People who bought in the enthusiasm stage come up to their breakeven price and face the same decision the greed stage buyers faced earlier: sell now or hold out for a rally. Even though there is good reason to fear, most do not sell here. They regret it later, but they hold on. Speculators generally only sell an asset when the pain of loss becomes acute. The pain threshold is different for each individual, but there is no real pain until the investment is worth less than the purchase price, so few sell for a profit or at breakeven. Inventories grow in the fear stage because many would like to sell, but sales volumes are light because few are willing to sell at prices buyers are willing to pay.

Prices do not rally here because there are even fewer buyers in the market and a reduced appetite for debt due to the change in market psychology. There are more and more sellers either choosing to sell or being forced to sell, and since there are more sellers than buyers, prices continue to drop. During the fear stage, a majority of buyers during the rally go underwater on their mortgages and endure the associated pain and stress. In the past, since the bubbles of the 80s and 90s were largely built on conventional mortgages, people just held on. During the Great Housing Bubble, people used exotic loan financing terms, and they simply could not afford to make their payments. They borrowed from other sources until their credit lines were exhausted and they imploded in foreclosure and bankruptcy. During this stage many renters who would otherwise have purchased a home put off their purchase and save more money because they correctly see the decline in prices has momentum and prices should continue to drop further.

Capitulation Stage

The transition from the fear stage to the capitulation stage is caused by the infectious belief that the rally is over. There is a tipping point where a critical mass of market participants either decide to sell or are forced to sell. In residential real estate, people are compelled to sell by anxiety, and the mechanism for force is foreclosure. Once a critical mass of selling is reached, the selling causes prices to decline further which in turn causes more selling. This convinces even more people the rally is over yielding even more selling: a downward spiral. The same price-to-price feedback mechanism that served to drive prices up during the rally works to drive prices down during the crash. Collectively, everyone in the market accepts prices are going to drop further, and they need to get out: Now! Of course when everyone knows prices are going to drop, and everyone is trying to sell, there are very few buyers. Each market participant has a different threshold for pain. Some give up early; some give up later; some stubbornly try to hold on, but in the end, by choice or by force, everyone who cannot afford their home sells out and capitulates to the forces of the market. Each seller accepts the market rally was a bubble, and the frenzy of selling activity clears out the overhead supply. The capitulation stage is the counterpart of the greed stage. Sellers are everywhere and buyers are scarce. This puts prices into free-fall until a critical mass of buyers is ready to buy again.

Since buyers in the aftermath of a bubble tend to be the risk averse who did not participate in it, they will make cautiously low offers on properties. Buyer caution is reinforced by lender caution. In stark contrast to the days of bubble lending, large downpayments are suddenly required, appraisals are carefully reviewed, eligibility is tighter, and most exotic loan programs are gone. This cautious buying together with desperate sellers causes the market to drop below normal valuation standards. The market enters the despair stage. Here the market participants think nobody wants the asset, and nobody ever will again. Of course, nothing could be farther from the truth as those who recognize the fundamental value of the asset are buying it in preparation for the next cycle.

Despair Stage

From a perspective of market psychology, it is difficult to tell when the ca-pitulation stage ends and the despair stage begins. Both stages have an extremely negative bearish sentiment. It is called the despair stage because most who own the asset are in despair and wish they did not own it, and the general public is still selling. Most who still own their homes are able to afford the monthly payments, but realize they will face a large loss if they sell their house anytime soon. They feel like prisoners in their own homes because they are unable to relocate for a better job or any other reason. One distinguishing feature of the despair stage is the increased buying activity of investors-true investors, not the speculators who were wiped out during the price decline. Investors are not in despair during this stage. This is the time they were anticipating to make their purchases.

There is an extreme emotional toll paid by those who participated in the mania. Losing a home to foreclosure is devastating. The emotional ties to a home go beyond seeing it as an investment. A home is supposed to be a safe haven where people raise a family. It is a unique reflection of the family, adorned with mementos and family photographs. Being forced to leave the family home is difficult for reasons that have nothing to do with money. Unfortunately, this is often followed by personal bankruptcy, and the difficulties in bankruptcy have everything to do with money.

In some ways, those who endure foreclosure may be the lucky ones as they get to leave their debtor’s prison and go find an affordable rental. The income that used to go toward housing is now freed up to go toward living a life. Those homeowners who hang on, who are desperately underwater, and who are putting 50% or more of their income toward a house worth less than they owe on it, their circumstances are arguably even more dire. There is no light at the end of their tunnel; they must live with their pain every day.

The despair stage is not desperate for everyone. What makes the despair stage different from the capitulation stage is that buyers who focus on funda-mentals like rental savings or positive cashflow return to the market and begin buying. Affordability has returned to the housing market, and those who did not participate in the mania finally get their chance to become homeowners-at reasonable prices. These buyers are not concerned with appreciation; they simply want an asset which provides a savings or a cash return on their investment. They are not frightened by falling prices because their financial returns are independent of the asset’s market valuation. It is the return of these people to the market that creates a bottom.

Where are we now?

The psychological stage of the market here in Irvine is different for the various market segments. The high end of the market is still firmly in denial. The Immunity Syndrome is in full effect. In some of the beach communities, this denial is moving toward fear because the inventory is so large, but here in Irvine, denial rules the high end. The middle of the market is showing fear. The price reductions are more numerous, and the occasional property like today’s show the transition from fear to capitulation. As we have documented on many occasions, the low end has already capitulated.

Old Listing

83 Vermillion   Irvine, CA 92603  kitchen

Old Asking Price: $660,000

Income Requirement: $165,000

Downpayment Needed: $132,000

Purchase Price: $660,000

Purchase Date: 11/23/2005

Address: 83 Vermillion Irvine, CA 92603

Beds: 3
Baths: 3
Sq. Ft.: 1,553
$/Sq. Ft.: $425
Lot Size:
Property Type: Attached, Condominium
Stories: 3+
Year Built: 2006
County: Orange
MLS#: I09034944
Source: MRMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 142 days

Turnkey * * * Property is being sold as a Short Sale * * * Subject to lender
approval * * * Beautiful 3 bedroom, 2 bath home located minutes away
from Irvine Spectrum * * * Property features tri-level floorplan, like
new paint, carpet, granite countertops. Stunning Turnkey Townhouse in
Best Location Viewing Greenbelt. Fully Upgraded & Customized with
Cherry Hardwood Floors, Ceramic Tile, Premiu m Carpets & Neutral
Two-Tone Paints. Awesome Kitchen with Cherry Cabinets, Stainless Steel
Appliances and Granite Counters, Island & Backsplash. Large Great
Room w/ Fireplace & Ceiling Surround Speakers. Formal Dining Rm,
Computer Room w/ Built-ins, Inside Laundry Rm, Main floor BR & BA.
‘PERFECT’! HOA Pool, Spa, Gym, Fireplace & More,

Title Case

* * * asterisks * * *

New Listing

New Asking Price: $439,000

Income Requirement: $109,750

Downpayment Needed: $87,800

Purchase Price: $660,000

Purchase Date: 11/23/2005

Address: 83 Vermillion Irvine, CA 92603

Beds: 3
Baths: 3
Sq. Ft.: 1,553
$/Sq. Ft.: $283
Lot Size: 700

Sq. Ft.

Property Type: Attached, Townhouse
Stories: 3+
Year Built: 2006
Community: Quail Hill
County: Orange
MLS#: I09087780
Source: MRMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 1 day

Beautiful Quail Hill 3 story Townhome. 3 bedrooms 3 baths, fireplace.
Balcony off Living Room and a Balcony off the Kitchen. Granite counters
and upgraded cabinets in kitchen. Enter from street thru greenbelt.
Attached 2 car garage. Community pool/spa/park.

It is pretty rare to see a 33% price reduction, but today’s featured property manages it. Of course, they are playing the short sale bidding war game, but when you look behind the gambits and into the mind of the seller, you see capitulation. This seller is no longer going to obtain the fantasy price that would have avoided all pain from their mistake. Now it is only a matter of how bad the consequences are. That is capitulation.

Will other owners give up and capitulate? Will mass capitulation lead to the collapse of pricing like in Las Vegas? With our current buying frenzy, this doesn’t seem likely, but market conditions can change quickly, particularly if new supply is added to the market.

Lemming Migration Along the Norwegian Coast (Britannica.com)

Fool's Gold

The housing bubble was another California gold rush, but it was all fool’s gold…. or was it?

53 Smokestone 42   Irvine, CA 92614  kitchen

Asking Price: $362,800

Address: 53 Smokestone #42 Irvine, CA 92614

{book}

Im standing alone
Im watching you all
Im seeing you sinking
Im standing alone
Youre weighing the gold
Im watching you sinking
Fools gold

Fools Gold — Stone Roses

When I started writing for the IHB, many bulls used to come to the blog and tell me I was wrong. Many of these people became knife catchers because they thought prices were at the bottom and there is a fortune to be made in California real estate. I am standing alone, and I see them sinking, weighed down by their fool’s gold.

There are many ways to look at the behavior we saw during the Great Housing Bubble. On Tuesday, I wrote about HELOCs as Risk Mitigation, and I wrote from the perspective that predatory borrowing is a rational choice given the circumstances.

The MEW spending frenzy we witnessed made homes very desirable. The general public has not forgotten the fun of the HELOC party. Many of today’s buyers are hoping for their own consumer orgy — chasing their own fool’s gold.

What if they are right? What if prices go up? What if we fuel another massive wave of debt creation and unsustainable spending?

There are people buying today because they believe prices have bottomed, just as they have for the last three years. Can the fantasy of kool aid intoxication be self-fulfilling? Will those chasing today’s fool’s gold be proven correct by their own actions?

The more some people pay for housing, the more others can borrow to spend and stimulate the economy. The Ponzi Scheme is great while it grows larger. Can we continually create one Ponzi Scheme after another?

I doubt it.

53 Smokestone 42   Irvine, CA 92614  kitchen

Asking Price: $362,800

Income Requirement: $90,700

Downpayment Needed: $72,560

Purchase Price: $315,000

Purchase Date: 8/27/2003

Address: 53 Smokestone #42 Irvine, CA 92614

Beds: 3
Baths: 2
Sq. Ft.: 1,164
$/Sq. Ft.: $312
Lot Size:
Property Type: Attached, Condominium
Stories: Ground Level
View: Park Or Green Belt
Year Built: 1980
Community: Woodbridge
County: Orange
MLS#: C09085046
Source: MRMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 1 day

EXCELLENT LOCATION CLOSE AWAY FROM SOUTH LAKE IN WOODBRIDGE COMMUNITY.
ALL WOODBRIDGE AMENITIES INCLUDING TENNIS, BIKE PATHS, SPORTS COURTS,
POOL AND SPA, AND MORE. GROUND LEVEL UNIT. GOOD SIZE LIVING ROOM,
3BEDS, 2 BATHS. PERFECT FOR FIRST TIME BUYER. YOU MUST TO SEE IT!!

YOU MUST TO SEE IT!! [shakes head] You must be kidding?

  • This property was purchased on 8/27/2003 for $315,000. The owner used a $252,000 first mortgage, a $63,000 second mortgage, and a $0 downpayment.
  • On 7/21/2005 he refinanced with a $360,000 first mortgage and pulled out $45,000 on his $0 investment.
  • On 10/26/2006 he refinanced again with a $432,000 first mortgage.
  • Total initial investment is $0.
  • Total property debt is $432,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $117,000.

Who was the fool here? This guy’s credit is trashed, but he got to spend $117,000. Was he the fool, or were we the fools for not doing the same?

David Stone – Quit smoking

Power Poker

Could the Irvine Company play “Power Poker” with our local housing market and support prices at inflated levels?

53 Carver   Irvine, CA 92620  inside

Asking Price: $699,000

Address: 53 Carver Irvine, CA 92620

{book2}

Devil

I am the menace in your eyes
The one you cant escape
Your life falls in my grasp
Your know your end is near

I tear your flesh to shreds
Burn holes throughout your mind
Your eyes now filled with blood
A victim of my force
In endless agony
You realize your defeat
Recite my masters chants


Show No Mercy
— Slayer

Have you ever watched the World Poker Tour? I used to watch it often. I remember one tournament where a single player had a significant chip lead over the others at the table. A big chip advantage allows players to overpower their opponents by forcing them to go “all in” just to be able to play. In the event I was watching, the chip leader used a stone cold bluff to force out opponents on a number of occasions. Sometimes the threat of power is power.

Ben Bernanke, the current Federal Reserve Board Chairman, knows how to run a bluff. In his 2002 speech, Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here, he presented the “helicopter drop” bluff as a way to bully financial markets.

The conclusion that deflation is always reversible under a fiat money
system follows from basic economic reasoning. A little parable may
prove useful: Today an ounce of gold sells for $300, more or less. Now
suppose that a modern alchemist solves his subject’s oldest problem by
finding a way to produce unlimited amounts of new gold at essentially
no cost. Moreover, his invention is widely publicized and
scientifically verified, and he announces his intention to begin
massive production of gold within days. What would happen to the price
of gold? Presumably, the potentially unlimited supply of cheap gold
would cause the market price of gold to plummet. Indeed, if the market
for gold is to any degree efficient, the price of gold would collapse
immediately after the announcement of the invention, before the
alchemist had produced and marketed a single ounce of yellow metal.

What has this got to do with monetary policy? Like gold, U.S. dollars
have value only to the extent that they are strictly limited in supply.
But the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or,
today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many
U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the
number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening
to do so
, the U.S. government can also reduce the value of a dollar in
terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to raising the prices
in dollars of those goods and services. We conclude that, under a
paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher
spending and hence positive inflation.

Notice that the threat of printing money has just as much effect as actually doing it. It is Power Poker Federal Reserve style.

Power Poker Irvine Style

So what does power poker have to do with our local housing market? We all know there is one big player with many chips in the Irvine housing market: The Irvine Company. They have full control (within political constraints) of the type, quantity, location and price of new homes in Irvine, they have enormous holdings of entitled land the value of which is strongly influenced by the activities of the resale market, and they have large amounts of cash being constantly generated from their income properties and ongoing operations. In short, they are in a position to play power poker.

Imagine what would happen if the Irvine Company decided to form a vulture fund to buy Irvine REOs. The Irvine Company has the cash to acquire every REO in Irvine, and they have the management company to rent out these properties and hold them off the for-sale market until prices recover. If the Irvine Company formed a fund and decided that all REO will be purchased at auction for $300/SF, they could buy all the REO and prevent an REO tsunami from washing away the value of their extensive holdings.

There are 75,815 dwelling units in Irvine, many of which are apartments. I can’t find the exact number, but there are around 45,000 houses and condos owned by regular people about one in ten of which are defaulting on their mortgages, and about one in three homes are owned with no mortgage. For the sake of running a simple calculation, let’s say that 3,000 Irvine homes will go through the process and become REO before the Great Housing Bubble has run its course.

If 3,000 homes go through foreclosure at an average price of $400,000, it would require $1,200,000,000 to buy them all. That would be a great deal of money to spend if the Irvine Company wanted to buy all the REO, but this is where Power Poker comes in — they don’t actually have to buy the REOs, they just need to credibly threaten to do so, and the market would change.

What would happen if the Irvine Company said it would buy all REOs at auction for $300/SF?

  • If investors believed TIC was serious, many speculators would step forward and buy these properties for $301/SF believing they are backstopped by TIC.
  • Many underwater homeowners would stay and pay rather than walking away because they believe their property values are being supported. This would serve to lower default rates by cutting back on ruthless defaults.
  • Buyers would no longer believe prices would fall further, and they would stop waiting for future price declines.

The combination of these factors would make it unnecessary for the Irvine Company to actually spend $1,200,000,000 to buy the REO; in fact, if the bluff is successful, they may not have to spend anything at all.

As a renter waiting to buy in Irvine, I do not want to see the Irvine Company do this. If I were a homeowner, I would not feel the same way. Of course, there is a risk that the gambit would fail, and the Irvine Company would buy $800,000,000 worth or real estate for $1,200,000,000, but there is also the possibility that prices will hold at $300/SF or above. As I demonstrated in Land Value 101 the value of the Irvine Company holdings are strongly impacted by the value of homes in the resale market. A $1,200,000 bluff may serve to preserve $12,000,000,000 in property value.

53 Carver   Irvine, CA 92620  inside

Asking Price: $699,000

Income Requirement: $174,750

Downpayment Needed: $139,800

Purchase Price: $800,000

Purchase Date: 9/14/2004

Address: 53 Carver Irvine, CA 92620

Beds: 7
Baths: 3
Sq. Ft.: 2,770
$/Sq. Ft.: $252
Lot Size: 4,750

Sq. Ft.

Property Type: Single Family Residence
Style: Contemporary
Stories: 2
Year Built: 1979
Community: Northwood
County: Orange
MLS#: S584525
Source: SoCalMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 2 days

Perfect Home For Large Family Within The Best Area Of Irvine. Modified
Plan With Up To 7 Bedrooms. Built In Outdoor Spa. Close To Shopping And
Schools. Don’t Miss This One It Will Sell Fast.

What did they do? finish off the attic?

This property was purchased for $800,000 on 9/14/2004 (which is amazing to me). The owners used a $640,000 first mortgage and a $160,000 downpayment. On 11/18/2005 they refinanced with a $714,750 first mortgage and a $142,950 stand-alone second. The total property debt is $857,700 plus accumulated missed payments. The owners borrowed themselves into oblivion, and they began defaulting back in early 2007:

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 07/09/2009
Document Type: Notice of Default
Document #: 2009000364972

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 11/12/2008
Document Type: Notice of Rescission
Document #: 2008000530065

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 01/04/2008
Document Type: Notice of Sale (aka Notice of Trustee’s Sale)
Document #: 2008000006033

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 10/01/2007
Document Type: Notice of Rescission
Document #: 2007000592079

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 09/27/2007
Document Type: Notice of Default
Document #: 2007000586776

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 05/23/2007
Document Type: Notice of Default
Document #: 2007000334839

This house has been in default as long as I have been writing for the IHB. It looks as if they have received two loan modifications, and they still can’t make the payments. Obviously, the lender was in no hurry to take this one back. The owners are now working on three years without a consistent mortgage payment, so they are also happy with the status quo.

If this property sells for its current asking price, and if a 6% commission is paid, the total loss to the lender will be $200,640.

Who is going to buy this 7-bedroom house? The Brady’s?

Going Flat

If you are renting rather than owning, you are “flat” real estate. Going flat can be a trading position to profit from, if the drop is deep enough.

Asking Price: $600,000

Address: 15 Iowa Irvine, CA 92606

{book3}

In ten minutes I’ll be laying out flat on the floor

Like I need to defend my own innocence
So what, I did it, I admit it, and I’m pleading the 5th
One more anthem for the know it all
I won’t be standing up for long I better learn how to crawl
Learn how to crawl

In ten minutes I’ll be laying out flat on the floor

Flat On The Floor — Nickelback

When traders takes a position in a market, they can be either “long” or “short.” If traders have no position, they are said to be “flat.” Traders who are long the market have an ownership stake, and they want to asset to go up in price. Traders who are short the market borrowed the asset, sold it, and they must repurchase the asset later to repay the debt. The short position is profitable if prices go down.

In residential real estate, it is not realistically possible to be short (you could play the futures though). Someone is not going to loan you their house and allow you to sell it to time the peak. What homeowners can do is to functions much the same: they can sell their home, go flat, and buy a different (presumably better) home later and profit from the difference. The “flat trade” is much more difficult than it sounds.

Real estate as an asset class has two significant drawbacks: (1) illiquidity and (2) high transaction costs. The problems make the flat trade challenging. When you sell a house, you will most likely pay a 6% commission. When you buy a house, you will incur closing costs and fees amount to about 4% of the transaction. When you consider the transaction costs, you must time the market to capture a 10% move, or you will actually lose money. Last year in Irvine, the Median Irvine home price is down 7.2 percent.

Nobody other than renters wants to see the flat trade be a success. Lenders know falling prices make for greater losses, the Federal Reserve knows low interest rates support higher prices, and the Government knows if they do not help the lenders and the Federal Reserve, then taxpayers are going to get the bill for the clean up; therefore, all the powers-that-be are scheming to keep prices high.

On a local level, we have tight supply and low transaction volumes sustaining prices about 30% above rental parity. Limiting supply — to the degree such a thing is possible — can theoretically keep prices at elevated levels indefinitely assuming the market remains at relatively low transaction volumes. This is certainly what property owners in Irvine want. Who can blame them?

If the REO inventory entering the system is large, and if it is sold relatively quickly, the increase in volume will cause prices to fall — probably the remaining 30% down to rental parity. If the market conditions that prevailed in 1997 recur, or if interest rates return to their historic norms, prices will fall more than 30%, and the flat trade would be very successful here.

Another variable that must be considered when contemplating the flat trade is your monthly cost versus renting. There are many people who may be able to profit from the short trade, but their current payments are less than rents because they locked in a payment many years ago. The people that have substantial equity may not want to try the short trade because it will cost them extra each month to rent. In fact, I would not recommend trying the short trade if you monthly cost of ownership is significantly below what the property would rent for.

The flat trade is getting much more difficult in many markets because the bulk of the declines have already occurred. Many nearby communities have declined below rental parity, and there are real bargains in some of these markets. There is still interest rate risk and overwhelming supply in these markets, but the subprime dominated markets are much closer to the bottom than to the top. The window of opportunity for the flat trade has closed in these markets.

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Another problem with the flat trade is timing it properly, and Timing Does Matter. It is difficult to sell into the frenzy because it is hard to predict when an irrational crowd will change. There were signs of a market top in 2004, just before the Option ARM took off and market prices went skyward. When timing the market, most people look for clear signs in the rear-view mirror.

For The Great Housing Bubble, the clear signal was the credit crunch and the onset of falling prices in August of 2007; unfortunately, the best signal is also a sign of a collapse in liquidity which makes a property much more difficult to sell. Waiting for the signal is clear may cost 5% or 10% of the sales price as a discount. Few have the savvy to identify and act on these signals; although, some of our esteemed members in the forums have done it — the flat trade is possible.

In any market decline, the most desirable properties will decline last. The mid to high end of the market has declined the least so far, but this merely means they have the furthest to fall. The flat trade is still possible here, and in the beach communities around Southern California, but this opportunity will pass quickly. Once prices get within 10% of the bottom, there isn’t enough drop left to profit from the flat trade.

Asking Price: $600,000

Income Requirement: $150,000

Downpayment Needed: $120,000

Purchase Price: $860,000

Purchase Date: 6/29/2006

Address: 15 Iowa Irvine, CA 92606

Beds: 4
Baths: 3
Sq. Ft.: 2,200
$/Sq. Ft.: $273
Lot Size: 4,840

Sq. Ft.

Property Type: Single Family Residence
Style: Mediterranean
Stories: 2
Year Built: 1999
Community: Walnut
County: Orange
MLS#: P697358
Source: SoCalMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 1 day

HIGHLY UPGRADED HARVARD SQUARE HOME. LOCATED IN A BEAUTIFUL GATED
COMMUNITY ON A QUITE CUL DE SAC.THIS HOME FEATURES PLANTATION SHUTTERS,
TILED FLOORS, MAPLE CABINETS, CUSTOMBUILT-INS, EXTRA LARGE
PROFESSIONALLY LANDSCAPED TROPICAL YARD WITH BUILT IN BARBEQUE. GREAT
PLACE TO ENTERTAIN AND RELAX. THIS HOME SHOWS VERY WELL. COLLEGE PARK
ELEMENTARY AWARD WINNING SCHOOL.

HIGHLY UPGRADED?

ALL CAPS

This property was purchased on 6/29/2006 for $860,000. The owners put some money down, but not enough to warrant hanging around.

Date Event Price Appreciation
Jul 30, 2009 Listed $600,000
Jun 29, 2006 Sold $860,000 13.3%/yr
May 01, 2003 Sold $579,000 15.0%/yr
Aug 31, 1999 Sold $347,000

This property is on a fast-track from default through foreclosure and eventual sale.

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 05/13/2009
Document Type: Notice of Sale (aka Notice of Trustee’s Sale)
Document #: 2009000240902

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 02/11/2009
Document Type: Notice of Default
Document #: 2009000063919

If this property sells for its current asking price, and if a 6% commission is paid, the total loss will be $296,000.

This property is nearly a 2003 rollback, and it is asking 30% off its peak purchase price.

California Rest In Peace

In a couple of weeks, California goes broke. Our Ponzi Scheme economy has collapsed, and the State must adjust to a new budget.

2 Flora Spgs   Irvine, CA 92602  kitchen

Asking Price: $949,900

Address: 2 Flora Spgs Irvine, CA 92602

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California Rest In Peace
Simultaneous Release
California Show Your Teeth
She’s my Priestess, I’m your Priest

Dani California — Red Hot Chili Peppers


According to our State Controller, John Chaing, we are going broke
. There are no more banks willing to extend us credit, and the Federal Government has told us to go pound sand. We are on our own.

So how did we get here?

We have a political system where the two parties have carved up the state into Gerrymandered districts that ensures the political parties maintain their numbers in our Legislature. Each party has learned to pander to special interest groups that turn out to keep their representatives in power. These legislators respond by paying off their special interests with state revenues making the special interest group even more powerful. Therefore, we have a deeply entrenched system of special interest payoffs from our State Government.

During times of economic expansion, money flows into state coffers at an increasing rate; however, the special interest competition for this money means it is spent even before it arrives. Since no special interest group is willing to accept a cut in its allocation, during times of economic distress when tax revenues fall, the entire State ceases to function, and politicians are faced with some very daunting decisions.

Right now, all over California, representatives are meeting with their special interest groups and explaining to them that they must accept a big cut to balance the budget. Nobody wants to hear it. However, since we cannot borrow our way out of this problem, the cuts are going to happen, it is just a matter of who gets cut and by how much. Some California legislators may lose their jobs over this.

Of course, none of this would be a problem if we had a stable housing market. The economic expansion we experienced since the millennium was caused almost entirely by HELOC spending. Since with was ephemeral, and since this spending is not coming back, we have to go back to a level of government services the populace can actually afford.

California legislators have an opportunity to stabilize house prices. I have outlined both A Free-Market Solution to Prevent Housing Bubbles and Regulatory Solutions to Prevent the Next Housing Bubble. However, since so many benefit from housing bubbles, and since the pain can be blamed on the wrong causes, we will probably not do anything to prevent this from happening again.

2 Flora Spgs   Irvine, CA 92602  kitchen

Asking Price: $949,900

Income Requirement: $237,475

Downpayment Needed: $189,980

Purchase Price: $716,500

Purchase Date: 3/19/2003

Address: 2 Flora Spgs Irvine, CA 92602

Beds: 3
Baths: 2
Sq. Ft.: 2,455
$/Sq. Ft.: $387
Lot Size: 10,500

Sq. Ft.

Property Type: Single Family Residence
Style: Mediterranean
Stories: 1
Year Built: 2003
Community: Northpark
County: Orange
MLS#: P693911
Source: SoCalMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 7 days

Gourmet Kitchen Award

Exceptional home is Impeccable and highly customized home sits at the
end of a cul-de-sac on approx 10,500 flat entertainer s lot! Every
attention to detail and quality has been addressed by the owners.
Making your way through the unique custom lead glass door through the
impressive entry and Foyer with hand painted walls you will find plenty
of room to entertain your guests. Formal dining room with French doors
that lead to a waterfall. Gourmet oversized kitchen with a Butler’s
pantry and a large Granite countertop island. Tile imported from Italy,
6 burner stove, and stainless steel appliances. French doors lead to
private backyard with 2 Waterfalls, Built-in BBQ with refrigerator.
Lots of room for entertaining. Master Bedroom has French doors leading
to the backyard by the waterfalls. Watch TV from your sunken Jacuzzi
tub in the Master Bedroom, separate shower with Marble. Recessed
lighting and crown molding throughout.

Everyone in Irvine is an entertainer — at least when they are not working 80 hours a week to pay their oversized mortgages.

The owner of today’s featured property must have entertained a bit because she did manage to spend her home.

  • The property was purchased for $716,500 on 3/19/2003. The owner used a $500,000 first mortgage, a $144,400 second mortgage, and a $72,100 downpayment.
  • On 7/28/2004 she refinanced with a $750,000 first mortgage.
  • On 7/11/2005 she refinanced with a $850,000 first mortgage.
  • On 8/23/2006 she took out a stand-alone second for $91,000.
  • On 11/16/2007 she refinanced with a $952,000 first mortgage.
  • Total property debt is $952,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $307,600.

If this property sells for its current asking price, the lender stands to lose $59,094 after a 6% commission. Not a big loss considering how stupid this loan was.

HELOC abuse is endlessly entertaining, isn’t it?

The California economy is enduring the loss of all the HELOC spending from spendthrifts like today’s featured property owner. This money is not coming back any time soon. No wonder our State is in such dire financial straits.