Irvine loan owners pose highest risk of strategic default

Borrowers with jumbo loans — most of Irvine — are most likely to strategically default a recent study shows.

Home Address … 23 TIOGA Irvine, CA 92602

Asking Price ……. $850,000

Play no games he'd say to me when the light is gone

He is right he'd say to me, we know who is wrong

So please don't make no hesitation

There will be no recreation

Jumbo said to say goodnight, he's a friend of yours

Bee Gees — Jumbo

Say goodnight to jumbo loans. The borrowers are going to default. Many jumbo loan holders have been hanging on despite the oversized payments because values have not fallen a great deal on higher priced properties. With the support from below being removed, the absence of a move-up market is causing higher priced properties to drift ever lower. This slow descent will continue, and as it does, more and more jumbo loan owners will see the futility in making huge payments and strategically default. Look out Irvine, this impacts you.

Jumbo mortgage holders pose highest risk of strategic default

A high number of jumbo mortgage owners — many located in high-cost markets hit by real estate deflation over the last several years — are stuck with persistent negative equity, a study shows.

November 13, 2011 — By Kenneth R. Harney

Reporting from Washington — Do you have a big mortgage and good credit scores but not much equity — maybe you're even underwater? Do you see little chance that your home's market value will improve a lot during the coming three to seven years?

If you answered yes to both questions — and thousands of homeowners across the country could do so — new research suggests that you are in a category that lenders need to worry about most: prime jumbo borrowers who once were thought to be among the safest bets, but who now are the most likely to opt for a strategic default and walk away from their homes.

Yes, the futility of paying will cause many to strategically default.

Remember, strategic default requires two parts, (1) the payment must exceed the cost of a comparable rental, and (2) the hope of future equity must be fleeting. If it were costing loan owners less to own than to rent, most would stay where they are. After all, they are saving money versus renting even with the lack of equity. If prices were going up, loan owners would feel their mortgage had option value as they would soon be back in-the-money as the appreciation fairies would bestow free money on them again soon.

If loan owners have neither saving versus renting, or the fantasy of future equity, they have little to keep them strategically defaulting. In those circumstances, it is in their best interest financially to do so.

In a study released Oct. 31, ratings firm Moody's said that based on its analysis of mortgage-backed bond portfolios, homeowners with jumbo mortgages now constitute “greater strategic default risk” than any other type of borrowers, including subprime.

That's because an exceptionally high number of jumbo loan owners — many located in high-cost markets hit by real estate deflation over the last several years — are stuck with persistent negative equity. More than half of the jumbos analyzed by Moody's in which owners are still making payments are underwater, or have home market values lower than their outstanding loan balances.

In addition, since most of these people grossly overpaid, they have a cost of ownership exceeding the cost of a comparable rental.

Jumbo loans are those that exceed the conventional limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Nationally, that ceiling is $417,000, but in high-cost areas between 2008 and Oct. 1 of this year, conventional limits ranged as high as $729,750. The maximum in those high-cost areas is now $625,500.

Meanwhile, Fair Isaac Corp., developer of the FICO credit score, says strategic defaults — in which owners can afford to keep paying their loans but see no economic rationale for doing so — continue to be a growing problem. More than 12 million mortgages are estimated to be underwater, and 30% of defaults on loans are strategic, according to Joanne M. Gaskin, FICO's predictive analytics director.

Is this really a problem? A problem for who? It's certainly a problem for banks, and it's a problem for those who don't strategically default who would benefit by it, but it's a solution for underwater loan owners, and it benefits everyone who wants more affordable housing.

Fair Isaac recently created a new type of score designed solely to spot potential strategic defaulters before they hand back the house keys. At least four of the top 10 largest lenders and servicers already are using it, contacting high-risk borrowers, offering financial solutions plus information about the costs associated with strategic walkaways.

Providing “information” on the costs of strategic default? In other words, they are bullshitting people with nonsense scare tactics to try to convince them it's not in their best interest to strategically default when in reality, it is.

The company says that its score can spot the riskiest homeowners, some of whom show telltale characteristics that make them as much as 110 times more likely to walk away than the least-risky borrowers.

Though FICO has not disclosed the specific risk combinations in the mathematical models supporting its proprietary score, the company confirms that among them are homeowners' good credit scores and payment performance on debts, low balances of outstanding revolving credit and a relatively short period of ownership of their current homes.

Gaskin lifted the lid on the FICO black box a smidgen more. Using a variety of data — including property values, historical valuation trends along with standard FICO scores and other information in credit bureau files — the strategic default score essentially tries to get inside homeowners' heads to predict their behavior.

“We're trying to understand from the consumer's perspective,” she said. “How much have I lost on the value of my home? What is the velocity of change?”

When the answers are grim and the prospects for equity recovery are distant, the probability that the owners will plot a strategic departure — often characterized by an abrupt halt to mortgage payments while staying current on credit cards and car payments — goes up sharply.

As it should. Remember, lenders inflated this housing bubble with their shoddy lending practices. It is fair and just for them to eat the losses in the aftermath. Each borrower who does not strategically default is agreeing to pay the losses of the lender who deserves it. Strategic default is moral imperative to prevent future housing bubbles.

“Most consumers have a pretty good idea of what the market is doing” in their local neighborhoods, Gaskin said.

What they often don't know, however, are the penalties they face for walking away. These include triple-digit drops in their credit scores — which will hamper their ability to rent a house or obtain credit for years — plus the possibility that lenders will find a way to seek recovery of whatever they owe after foreclosure proceedings.

Strategic default will not hamper their ability to rent, nor will it stop them from obtaining credit for years. Lenders will give credit cards to people a day out of bankruptcy. Lenders are little better than drug pushers hanging out at the discharge door of a rehab center. They don't want the credit addicted to get away, so they make their product available when people are vulnerable.

About a dozen states, including California, restrict “deficiency” recoveries. But in most states lenders are free to pursue whatever assets they can locate, and often do so if the amount of unrecovered debt is large enough to justify the legal expenses.

Ultimately, strategic default for many owners boils down to a calculation: Are the costs, financial and otherwise, worth the relief from an albatross house and mortgage? If the Moody's study is accurate, thousands of jumbo borrowers are struggling with that calculation right now, and a lot of them are likely to bail out.

kenharney@earthlink.net

Distributed by Washington Post Writers Group.

The housing bust is over five years old now, and we still haven't found a durable bottom. Kool aid intoxication is dying, and so are the dreams of jumbo loan owners everywhere. One way or another, people will be relieved of the excessive debt burdens of the bubble years. Strategic default, short sale, foreclosure, and bankruptcy are all options we will see plenty of going forward, unless of course, they decide to forgive everyone's underwater principal balance… not going to happen.

Option ARM implosion

Now that we are five or more years into many of the bubble era Option ARMs, many are facing payment recasts where the loan converts to fully amortizing over the remaining term of the loan. When this occurs, even if interest rates are low, the payment is going to skyrocket. Many of these loan owners could never afford the property anyway, so when their payment goes way up, default becomes inevitable.

The owners of today's featured property bought at the peak with an Option ARM, and they have strategically defaulted.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 11/04/2011

Document Type: Notice of Default

They won't be the last.

Look for more supply like this home to hit the market over the next several years as high end prices continue to show weakness.

——————————————————————————————————————————————-

This property is available for sale via the MLS.

Please contact Shevy Akason, #01836707

949.769.1599

sales@idealhomebrokers.com

Home Address … 23 TIOGA Irvine, CA 92602

Asking Price ……. $850,000

Beds: 6

Baths: 3

Sq. Ft.: 3700

$230/SF

Property Type: Residential, Single Family

Style: Two Level, Mediterranean

Year Built: 1998

Community: West Irvine

County: Orange

MLS#: S679690

Source: CRMLS

Status: Active

On Redfin: 13 days

——————————————————————————

(no description)

——————————————————————————————————————————————-

Proprietary commentary and analysis

Asking Price ……. $850,000

Purchase Price … $1,075,000

Purchase Date …. 9/23/2005

Net Gain (Loss) ………. ($276,000)

Percent Change ………. -25.7%

Annual Appreciation … -3.7%

Cost of Home Ownership

————————————————-

$850,000 ………. Asking Price

$170,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

4.02% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$680,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$175,704 ………. Income Requirement

$3,254 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$737 ………. Property Tax (@1.04%)

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$177 ………. Homeowners Insurance (@ 0.25%)

$0 ………. Private Mortgage Insurance

$371 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$4,539 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$754 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$976 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment (Amortization)

$238 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$126 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$3,173 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$8,500 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$8,500 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$6,800 ………. Interest Points

$170,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$193,800 ………. Total Cash Costs

$48,600 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$242,400 ………. Total Savings Needed

——————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Larry Roberts is hosting a Las Vegas cashflow properties presentation at the offices of Intercap Lending (9401 Jeronimo, Suite 200, Irvine, CA 92618) on December 7, 2011, at 6:30. Please RSVP at sales@idealhomebrokers.com.

Blair Applegate of Peter Schiff's Euro Pacific Capital, Inc. will be presentating at the offices of Intercap Lending (9401 Jeronimo, Suite 200, Irvine, CA 92618) at 7:30 on December 7, 2011. Please RSVP at sales@idealhomebrokers.com.

31 thoughts on “Irvine loan owners pose highest risk of strategic default

  1. *

    “More than half of the jumbos analyzed by Moody’s … are underwater”

    i shouldn’t be, but i’m surprised by how high that number is.

    1 out of 2 jumbo’s are underwater.

  2. mangaku

    “More than half of the jumbos analyzed by Moody’s … are underwater”

    I wonder if this takes into consideration all the 2nd’s and HELOC’s?

  3. Duran

    “Lenders are little better than drug pushers hanging out at the discharge door of a rehab center. They don’t want the credit addicted to get away, so they make their product available when people are vulnerable”.

    That was the whole plan, the vast majority of the Public just can’t see it.

    The big Institutions and Private Investors will buy Property at massive discounts, rent them out to distressed Families who’s alternative will be to live on the streets, then make them pay for these Properties via rent.

    Even People I used to have a great deal of respect for are partaking in this appaling practice…

    Profiting from People’s misery

    1. IrvineRenter

      So providing rental homes to people who would otherwise be sleeping in the street is taking advantage of them and ripping them off?

      I just ripped off a distressed family who used to make $2,200 a month payments by charging them $1,000 per month to stay in the same house.

      I sleep well at night.

      1. Duran

        “So providing rental homes to people who would otherwise be sleeping in the street is taking advantage of them and ripping them off”?

        That is obviously a rhetorical question.

        “I just ripped off a distressed family who used to make $2,200 a month payments by charging them $1,000 per month to stay in the same house”.

        Thank you for proving my point.

        “I sleep well at night”

        1. Perspective

          Taking your point to its outer reach, anyone who sells anything that is not necessary, is profiteering from someone else’s stupidity, lack of sophistication, misery, etc.

        2. octal77

          …ripping them off…

          Does this thinking extend to the stock market?

          If I see good value in a stock @ $10 and the next day this very same stock rises to $22, am I “ripping off” some poor individual who sold to me @$10 yesterday?

    2. HydroCabron

      The big Institutions and Private Investors will buy Property at massive discounts, rent them out to distressed Families who’s alternative will be to live on the streets, then make them pay for these Properties via rent.

      This must be satire.

      Please let this be satire.

      1. awgee

        I assure you it is not. Some people truly think that anybody who makes money is ripping somebody else off.

  4. irvine_home_owner

    “Borrowers with jumbo loans — most of Irvine — are most likely to strategically default a recent study shows.”

    Most of Irvine? Where is the data that supports that claim?

    From what I remember, many of Irvine sales are all or large cash downs so to say “most of Irvine” borrowers have jumbo loans is a bit misleading.

    And isn’t the Option Arm Monster dead? Haven’t most of those loans already converted to fixed, been loan modded, foreclosed on or remain carried by people who *can* afford them?

    Like that Tsunami of Shadow Inventory… I’m not sure what type of impact OARM recasts are going to have anymore.

    1. IrvineRenter

      The median loan for most of 2004-2008 was over $417,000 which by definition puts at least half the loans in Irvine into jumbo loan status.

      Further, if you notice, very few of our foreclosures have been GSE or FHA homes because that financing was not as prevalent. The segment of the market where these loans were most common (the under $500,000 peak price segment) is the part of the market which has shown most weakness because the government has been foreclosing and pushing people out. Most of the delinquent mortgage squatters in Irvine have jumbo loans.

      1. irvine_home_owner

        The median being over $417k does not mean “most of Irvine”… maybe “at least half”. I think you’re word-smithing a bit here.

        And “most of the delinquent mortgage squatters in Irvine have jumbo loans” does not equal “Borrowers with jumbo loans–most of Irvine” either.

        #occupyJumboLoans

    2. Perspective

      Anecdotal evidence, but, I have two neighbors who bought at the same time as me in 2007, who are just now “moving” because their 5-year interest-only piggyback mortgages are about to reset to fully-amortizing payments.

        1. Perspective

          Yes, this is in Irvine. I put “moving” in quotes because that’s literally what they’ve done, but that’s after months of not paying their mortgage and trying to short sell their homes.

          1. IrvineRenter

            If you get a chance to ask them (and if you think it’s appropriate), find out why they moved out before the foreclosure auction. I always wonder why people don’t squat until the last minute. I suspect it’s because they want closure and want to move on with their lives, but I don’t know for sure.

          2. Perspective

            That’s exactly it. They’re annoyed at the short sale process. Cleaning-up the house for showings isn’t fun. Finding prospective rental homes and then losing them when multiple short sales fall through is frustrating. It’s not fun always talking about it with friends and family. Those are the sentiments I’ve heard.

          3. Axiom

            We have neighbors who moved out immediately when they received notice that their loan mod request had been denied. Then they moved back in after the first short sale offer fell through, probably 6 or 7 months later.

            When I asked about moving out and back in they said they didn’t realize they could stay until they contacted an attorney. I think there are people who don’t realize they can game the system.

            Last I heard they had been granted a loan mod and were going to try and keep the house, although they admitted finances were still really tight.

            I think there are people out there who don’t

          4. SanJoseRenter

            IR:

            It would be great if you could chase moving trucks around Irvine for a couple months and interview the people moving out.

            Might be an interesting chapter on homeloaner psychology for the second edition of your book.

            Seems like the only way to get that kind of info is to ask for it. I haven’t seen much in the local newspaper or online about the reasons and perceptions involved in foreclosure.

          5. awgee

            It is interesting how often emotions win out over pure financial logic. It did in our house. We bought.

          6. irvine_home_owner

            @awgee

            Truth. Can’t even convince the wife to rent even if it’s a bigger house, nicer area and a lower payment.

          7. Kelli

            Valid points, all. And then there is the school question for families. Finding a house in your school district (or a good alternative) at the right time to prove residency means moving early or being homeless for a time.

            Anyone with their wits about them and a few dollars in their pocket will choose the former. We left a lot of money on the table when we left our (jumbo’d, underwater) house, but on the other hand we’re six months to a year closer to being able to buy again. This time at the true bottom, or close enough.

  5. Irvine Observer

    Would the sales price of this house be considered at Rental Parity?

    Would a typical investor view the Monthly Cash Outlays or the Monthly Cost of Ownership figure?

    1. IrvineRenter

      An investor would focus more on the monthly cash outlays because and investor is trying to make a profit. An owner-occupant would look at the monthly cost of ownership figure because it most accurately captures the true cost comparable to a rental.

  6. winstongator

    “Flip This House”: Investor Speculation and the Housing Bubble

    we present new findings from our recent New York Fed study that uses unique data to suggest that real estate “investors”—borrowers who use financial leverage in the form of mortgage credit to purchase multiple residential properties—played a previously unrecognized, but very important, role. These investors likely helped push prices up during 2004-06; but when prices turned down in early 2006, they defaulted in large numbers and thereby contributed importantly to the intensity of the housing cycle’s downward leg.

    I’ve been posting this type of idea for at least 2 years, usually linking to CalculatedRisk

    Vacation- and investment-home sales both set records in 2005, with the combined total of second home sales accounting for four out of 10 residential transactions, according to the National Association of Realtors®

    Is it a shame that it’s taken 6 years for the Fed to notice the explosion in second home sales, or reassuring that they finally get it?

  7. Anonymous

    Jumbo loans require jumbo income to make the payments. Perhaps some people who made the good income before (ex. stock options, bonuses, sales commisions, small business profits, etc) no longer do so and can’t afford the same lifestyle anymore.

    Also, job loss. If you have to move for the new job – you have to move.

  8. SanJoseRenter

    Susan, NBR: Is the S&P downgrade a wake-up call for the Euro zone?
    Bob Doll, BlackRock: Well, there’s been lots of wake-ups calls.

    🙂

Comments are closed.